Leadership & Decision-Makers

Trump's approach to foreign policy is grounded in the deliberate cultivation of unpredictability. This is not impulsiveness — it is a calculated strategy rooted in his understanding of negotiation leverage. RAND Corporation analysis of Trump-era coercive diplomacy identifies "strategic ambiguity about red lines and escalation thresholds" as the defining feature of his foreign policy approach, distinguishing it from the more telegraphed approach of conventional administrations.

• Adversary uncertainty: By refusing to establish clear red lines publicly, Trump forces adversaries to assume worst-case scenarios about potential US responses, creating a deterrence premium
• Alliance uncertainty: The same unpredictability that deters adversaries also unsettles allies, who cannot reliably predict US behavior and must therefore invest more in independent capability — an outcome Trump views as desirable (burden-sharing pressure)
• Media cycle dominance: Unpredictable actions generate maximum media coverage, ensuring that Trump controls the narrative cycle. The February 28 strikes exemplify this: launched without warning, dominating global news for days
• Negotiation leverage: The "madman theory" (borrowed consciously or unconsciously from Nixon) creates leverage at the bargaining table. An adversary facing an unpredictable leader must offer larger concessions to secure a deal

"I like to be unpredictable. It's not good when they know exactly what you're going to do." — Donald Trump, articulating the core of his foreign policy philosophy

Analysis of Trump's first and second presidential terms reveals a consistent four-phase pattern in coercive diplomacy that CSIS has termed the "Trump escalation-negotiation cycle":

Analyst Note The critical question is whether Phase 3 can proceed effectively. Mojtaba Khamenei was elected Supreme Leader on March 8, restoring a formal head of state, but his March 12 statement was maximally hostile. President Pezeshkian's 3 peace conditions offer a potential diplomatic channel, but the IRGC — which engineered Mojtaba's appointment — may block any negotiation track. Trump's preferred exit strategy — the dramatic deal — requires an Iranian counterpart willing to engage, and none has yet signaled that willingness.

The White House outlined four military objectives for Operation Epic Fury: [White House]

1. Prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons
2. Destroy Iran's missile arsenal and production sites
3. Degrade proxy networks
4. Annihilate Iran's navy

Trump projected the conflict lasting "four to five weeks." However, multiple outlets have documented shifting rationales since the campaign began:

• VP Vance: "We are not at war with Iran, we're at war with Iran's nuclear programme" — framing the conflict as limited and targeted [CNN]
• Defense Secretary Hegseth: Goals are "laser-focused" on missiles, drones, navy, and nuclear pathway — emphasizing military rather than political objectives [WaPo]
• Trump on social media: "If the current Iranian Regime is unable to MAKE IRAN GREAT AGAIN, why wouldn't there be a Regime change???" — openly signaling regime change as a desired outcome [CNBC]
• NPR analysis: Documented "shifting White House messaging" on the war's purpose and scope [NPR]
• PBS fact-check: Examined statements made by Trump to justify strikes [PBS]
• NYT: Three unnamed American officials said Trump exaggerated the immediacy of the missile threat to the US

Analyst Note The gap between Vance's "not at war with Iran" framing and Trump's social media posts about regime change reflects a tension that NPR, PBS, and CNN have all noted: the administration has not settled on a single coherent public justification for the campaign's scope and objectives.

Trump's Iran policy has evolved from economic maximum pressure (2018–2020 sanctions campaign) to military maximum pressure (2026 strikes). This escalation follows a logic identified by Brookings Institution scholars: when sanctions fail to achieve objectives, leaders who have framed their approach as "maximum pressure" face a binary choice between abandoning the frame (perceived as weakness) or escalating to military force.

• First term (2018–2020): Withdrew from JCPOA; imposed "maximum pressure" sanctions; assassinated Soleimani but did not follow through with sustained campaign
• Interregnum (2021–2025): Iran advanced nuclear program significantly during Biden administration's attempted diplomatic re-engagement; enrichment reached 60%+ levels
• Second term (2025–present): Inherited a more advanced Iranian nuclear program; reimposed and escalated sanctions; framed in SOTU (Feb 24) as imminent threat; launched strikes four days later
• Escalation logic: Having defined Iran as the paramount threat and committed to "maximum pressure," the doctrine demanded military action when sanctions proved insufficient to halt nuclear progress

Negotiation Principles Applied to War

Trump's negotiation philosophy, as articulated in The Art of the Deal (1987) and demonstrated across decades of business and political practice, provides the analytical framework for understanding his wartime decision-making. CFR scholars have identified several key principles operating in the current conflict:

• "Think big": Start with maximalist demands (regime change) to create negotiation space. The stated objective may not be the actual objective — it establishes the high-water mark from which concessions can be made while still claiming victory
• "Use leverage": Create asymmetric leverage through dramatic action. The February 28 strikes and Khamenei assassination established overwhelming leverage — the problem is finding someone to leverage it against
• "Know when to walk away": Willingness to abandon negotiations (or conflicts) abruptly is itself a negotiation tool. The 4–5 week public timeline may be designed to create urgency: "deal now or I leave and the bombs keep falling"
• "Protect the downside": Simultaneous economic management (oil reserve releases, shipping insurance offers, Saudi production coordination) reflects an instinct to hedge the conflict's economic downside
• "Maximize options": Maintaining multiple potential outcomes (regime change, negotiated deal, containment) allows Trump to claim victory under various scenarios

• Midterm framing: The 2026 midterms (November) create a political window. A war concluded "victoriously" before summer could be a powerful campaign asset; a war still grinding in October could be devastating for the GOP
• Base management: Trump's political base rewards perceived strength and decisiveness. The strikes satisfy this demand. Extended, ambiguous conflict erodes the "winner" brand that is Trump's core political asset
• Legacy calculation: Trump is keenly aware of presidential legacy. Being "the president who ended Iran's nuclear threat" is a powerful legacy claim — but "the president who started another endless Middle East war" is the catastrophic alternative
• Media cycle control: Trump's instinct for dominating news cycles is both an asset (rally effect, narrative control) and a liability (any negative development becomes a 24/7 story he cannot escape)
• Economic sensitivity: Trump is acutely sensitive to economic indicators, particularly gas prices and stock market performance. Rising gas prices and market volatility create direct political pressure to resolve the conflict quickly

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the opening strikes on February 28, 2026, along with his daughter, son-in-law, and grandson. Iranian state media (IRNA) confirmed his death on March 1 after initial false claims he was "safe and sound." The New York Times wrote that Israel had "crossed a new Rubicon, killing the head of state of a sovereign country." [Wikipedia] [Al Jazeera]

40+ Senior Officials Killed

Simultaneous strikes hit three sites where senior officials were convening. Confirmed dead include: [Al Jazeera] [Wikipedia]

Verified [Al Jazeera] [NPR] [Wikipedia] Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the slain Supreme Leader, was elected by the Assembly of Experts on March 8, 2026 following an online session that began March 3. US/Israeli bombs struck the Assembly office in Qom after votes were cast but before the count was completed.

Profile

• Age: 56 years old
• Military background: Served in the IRGC during the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War
• Pre-war role: Described as the "principal gatekeeper" and "the power behind the robes" in US diplomatic cables [CNBC]
• IRGC pressure: The IRGC exerted "repeated contacts and psychological and political pressure" on the Assembly of Experts to select him [Slate]
• Analyst assessment: Described as "more dangerous" than his father [Source]

First Public Statement (March 12)

After 4 days of silence that fueled rumors he had been injured in an airstrike, Mojtaba broke his silence on March 12 via Iranian state TV. His statement: [NBC News] [Al Jazeera]

• Vowed to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed
• Threatened to attack countries hosting US military bases unless those bases are closed
• Pledged continued resistance against the US-Israeli campaign

Before Mojtaba's election, a three-person council assumed temporary leadership duties under Iran's constitutional succession provisions: [Al Jazeera]

• President Masoud Pezeshkian (civilian executive authority)
• Chief Justice Mohseni-Ejei (judicial authority)
• Guardian Council jurist Alireza Arafi (religious authority)

This council managed basic state functions during the 8-day interregnum but lacked the constitutional authority to direct military strategy — a role reserved for the Supreme Leader.

President Pezeshkian (a reformist) has positioned himself as a potential diplomatic channel, distinct from the IRGC war-fighting apparatus. His public statements signal willingness to negotiate under conditions: [Source]

• Described the killing of Khamenei as a "great crime" that would not go unanswered
• Held diplomatic discussions with leaders of Russia and Pakistan
• Attended the March 13 Al-Quds Day rally in Tehran alongside SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani [Al Jazeera]

Three Stated Peace Conditions

1. Recognition of Iran's legitimate rights
2. Payment of reparations by the United States and Israel
3. Firm international guarantees against future aggression

Analyst Note Pezeshkian's conditions are maximalist opening positions unlikely to be accepted in current form, but they represent the clearest signal from any Iranian official that a diplomatic track exists. The tension between Pezeshkian's diplomatic signaling and Mojtaba's hardline vows reflects the ongoing IRGC vs. civilian government dynamic.

Verified [RFE/RL] With the top IRGC brass killed, Iran has deployed a decentralized "Mosaic" defense strategy. This pre-existing doctrine divides operational authority across geographically dispersed units that can operate autonomously when central command is disrupted.

• Decentralized command: Regional and theater commanders are operating with significant autonomy, executing pre-planned defensive operations without requiring central coordination
• Proxy autonomy: Geographically dispersed proxy forces (Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraqi militias) are operating autonomously with reduced but functional communication links to Iranian handlers
• Cyber limitations: IRGC state-sponsored cyber groups have been less active due to Iran's near-total internet blackout (~1% connectivity), degrading their ability to coordinate digital operations

Netanyahu is managing the most complex military situation Israel has faced since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The simultaneous prosecution of operations against Iran (deep strikes), Hezbollah (Lebanon ground/air campaign), and defensive operations against multiple proxy threats demands strategic bandwidth that stretches even Israel's sophisticated military command structure.

• Iran theater (Operation Roaring Lion): Joint operations with the US targeting nuclear facilities, missile production, IRGC command infrastructure, and military-industrial capacity. Netanyahu's war cabinet treats this as the "once in a generation" opportunity to eliminate the existential nuclear threat
• Lebanon theater: IDF ground and air operations against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon represent the largest Israeli military operation in Lebanon since 2006. The objective is to push Hezbollah rocket capability beyond range of northern Israeli population centers
• Defensive operations: Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow interceptor systems defending against rocket barrages (Hezbollah), ballistic missiles (Iran residual), and drone threats (multiple sources). Interceptor stockpile depletion is the most acute operational concern
• Gaza/West Bank: Reduced but ongoing security operations to prevent a third axis of attack from Palestinian militant groups

Netanyahu's personal political situation is inseparable from his war leadership. IISS analysis identifies this entanglement as both a strength (total commitment to victory) and a risk (inability to accept outcomes short of maximalism).

• Legal proceedings: Corruption trials ongoing but effectively suspended during wartime; prolonged conflict delays unfavorable legal outcomes
• Coalition stability: Far-right coalition partners (Smotrich, Ben Gvir) demand maximalist war aims; any perceived moderation risks coalition collapse and elections that Netanyahu might lose
• Wartime unity: Opposition parties have joined a de facto national unity framework, suppressing the massive protest movements that characterized pre-war Israeli politics. War's end would reignite domestic political challenges
• Legacy as "Mr. Security": Netanyahu has built his political identity around security leadership. Eliminating the Iranian nuclear threat would cement his legacy as Israel's most consequential security leader since Ben-Gurion
• Institutional incentive: Every structural incentive points toward prolonged conflict and maximalist objectives; there is no personal political benefit to Netanyahu from a quick, compromised settlement

• Personal rapport: Strong personal relationship dating to Trump's first term; mutual respect based on shared transactional approach to politics. Trump values Netanyahu's loyalty and public praise; Netanyahu values Trump's willingness to break diplomatic norms in Israel's favor
• First-term deliverables: Jerusalem embassy move, Golan Heights recognition, Abraham Accords, JCPOA withdrawal — the most pro-Israel US policy portfolio in history. Creates expectation that second-term cooperation will be equally productive
• Shared framing: Both leaders frame the conflict as necessary prevention against an existential nuclear threat, creating public narrative alignment even when private strategic calculations differ
• Asymmetric dependency: Israel depends on US military capability (precision munitions, intelligence, air refueling) far more than the reverse. This asymmetry gives Washington leverage if it chooses to exercise it — but Trump has shown no inclination to pressure Netanyahu so far

Background & Decision-Making Style

• Military service: Army National Guard veteran with deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan; combat experience provides operational credibility but at a tactical rather than strategic level
• Media background: Former Fox News host; brings a communication-first approach to the Secretary of Defense role that prioritizes public narrative alongside operational planning
• Hawkish orientation: Publicly advocated for aggressive Iran policy for years on cable news; ideologically aligned with the strike decision. No indication of internal opposition to regime change objective
• Relationship with military establishment: Viewed with skepticism by career Pentagon officials and senior uniformed military. The conventional defense establishment's institutional preference for measured, objective-limited operations may conflict with Hegseth's more aggressive instincts
• Information operations emphasis: Hegseth's media instincts appear to influence Pentagon communications strategy. Daily briefings are notably more narrative-driven and visually oriented than previous administrations — designed for cable news consumption

Wartime Decision-Making Assessment

Hegseth's role in the war's prosecution is assessed as primarily political-communicative rather than operational-strategic. Actual military planning and execution run through the Joint Chiefs (particularly the Chairman) and CENTCOM commander. Hegseth's influence is concentrated on:

• Target approval: SecDef approval required for sensitive targets (leadership, dual-use infrastructure, sites near civilian areas). Hegseth's hawkish orientation suggests a lower threshold for approving strikes that career military might defer or restrict
• Rules of engagement: Setting the parameters for military operations; Hegseth's approach appears to favor broader authorities for commanders rather than restrictive ROE
• Public communication: Managing the narrative of the war through Pentagon briefings, media access, and social media. Hegseth's cable news experience makes him more comfortable with aggressive public messaging than typical SecDefs
• Force deployment decisions: Recommendations to the President on troop levels, additional carrier deployments, and potential ground force options. These decisions will become critical if the air campaign proves insufficient

Post-Nasrallah Hezbollah

Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's long-time Secretary General, was killed in an Israeli airstrike in September 2024. Hezbollah's current leadership is operating under successor command structures that were activated following his death. The organization's military apparatus was designed for semi-autonomous operations with pre-planned escalation ladders — a design feature developed over decades that proves its value as both Hezbollah's own senior leadership and Iranian central command have been degraded.

• Operational autonomy: Hezbollah's pre-established autonomous operational capability allows continued military operations (sustained rocket fire into northern Israel) without real-time Iranian direction
• Lebanese ground invasion (March 3): IDF launched the largest Israeli ground/air operation in Lebanon since 2006; 687 killed in Lebanon as of reporting [Al Jazeera]
• Existential stakes: If Iran falls, Hezbollah's state sponsor disappears. Full commitment to the war is both an organizational survival choice and ideological imperative for the "resistance axis"
• Political dimension: Lebanon's civilian government has effectively lost control over the country's foreign policy and security posture; 800,000+ displaced within Lebanon